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Abstract 
This paper examines the influence of secondary offerings (SOs) on the liquidity and trad-
ing activity of stocks outstanding. The results reveal that liquidity and trading activity in-
crease after the execution of SOs. We observe that the offering discount is explained by 
the size of the offering and its retail composition. We have also shown that changes in li-
quidity and trading activity are explained by the retail composition of the offering, such 
that the choice of ownership structure is decisive in the level of liquidity afforded by SOs. 
The offering discount is one of the chosen methods of attracting small-scale investors and 
promoting share liquidity following these operations. 
1. Introduction 
A large number of studies have analyzed the impact of certain operations on 
share liquidity and trading activity in the stock market. To mention some of the key 
contributions, Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000) examine seasoned equity offerings; 
Brockman and Chung (2001) repurchase tender offers; Dennis and Strickland (2003) 
and Menéndez and Gómez-Ansón (2003) stock splits; and Menyah and Paudyal (1996) 
and Farinós and Fernández (1999) takeovers.
1 Among the main references on the sub-
ject of initial public offerings (IPOs) we can mention Pham, Kalev, and Steen (2003), 
Eckbo and Norli (2005), and Ellul and Pagano (2006). 
One of the main purposes of IPOs is to increase share liquidity. By meeting 
this objective it is possible to obtain better terms for ensuring the issue of new capi-
tal and thereby increase the efficiency of future placings. However, the liquidity ob-
tained is not entirely independent of the decisions taken by firms when designing 
IPOs. In regard to this, both Pham et al. (2003) and Ellul and Pagano (2006) relate 
the liquidity obtained to the degree of underpricing of IPOs. Pham et al. (2003) actu-
ally claim that underpricing is the cost of the liquidity, since it is the compensation 
offered by the firm to attract small-scale investors that will help to generate liquidity. 
Thus, prior ownership structures and decisions affecting the variables or defining cha-
racteristics of IPOs may play a decisive role in determining the nature of the rela-
tionship between liquidity and underpricing. 
* Acknowledgement: The authors would like to thank the ERDF and the Spanish Ministry of Education and 
Science (SEJ2006-14809-C03-02) for financial support. 
1Except for (Farinós, Fernández, 1999), the rest of the literature on takeovers focuses on the announcement 
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The results for IPOs could be extended to secondary offerings (SOs). A se-
condary offering, also called a secondary public offering, is the public sale of a large 
block of outstanding shares in which one or more of a firm’s stockholders sell all or 
a large portion of their holding. As in the case of IPOs, sellers have to present a pro-
spectus in the stock market showing the structure of the offering (retail and institu-
tional tranches, offer price, offer period, etc.). At close of the offer period, prospec-
tive buyers are notified of the outcome of their bids.
2 It is important to note that this 
kind of offering does not increase the number of stocks outstanding on the market, 
because no new shares are released. This is the original meaning of the term. How-
ever, the name SO is also used to refer to follow-on offerings of new shares from 
a firm that has already made its IPO. In this paper, we will use the term secondary 
offering in its original sense only. That is, we will work with offerings representing 
sales of stock by shareholders who wish to decrease their positions in a firm. These 
are offerings in the secondary market, as opposed to those made by firms to raise ca-
pital, which are aimed at the primary market. 
The main difference between IPOs and SOs is that prior to the IPO there are 
no outstanding shares. Since this can constitute a major difference, there is no reason 
why the effects deriving from IPOs and SOs should be identical. In fact, in an SO 
the previous shares outstanding in the market may affect ex post liquidity and trading 
activity following the execution of the offering. Despite these considerations, as far 
as we are aware, there have been no previous analyses of the possible influence of 
SOs on the liquidity and trading activity of stocks outstanding.
3
This paper therefore aims to analyze some of the issues relating to the effects 
of SOs on stock liquidity and trading activity. Although operations of this type do not 
change the number of shares outstanding, they should encourage market trading of 
the firm’s shares and increase liquidity, since they have the opposite effect of a take-
over in that they put a large block of shares on the market that were formerly held by 
only one or a small number of stockholders.
4 In this context, the first issue to be ad-
dressed is whether SOs affect liquidity and trading activity in shares outstanding and 
whether the effects are what might be expected from such operations. In particular, 
taking into account the arguments of the information-based hypothesis, the increment 
in the number of investors and analyst coverage of the stock, as a consequence of 
the increment of the shares traded, will produce an increase in the amount of infor-
mation that is made public, reducing the level of informed trading and the level of 
asymmetric information (see (Li, McInish, Wongchoti, 2005)) and thus narrowing 
the bid-ask spread. Furthermore, although there is no variation in the number of out-
standing shares, the free float increases as shares previously held by major investors 
come into the market. This increase in the free float may induce an increase in 
the optimal portfolio weights if the correlation structure remains unchanged, leading 
to an increment in trading volume by liquidity investors.
5
2 These features constitute the distinction between an SO and a block trade. Block trading, usually between
institutional investors, takes place in a special market segment to prevent major price effects. 
3 The only existing studies check for abnormal negative returns following this type of operation (Farinós,
2001), and (Clarke, Dunbar, Kahle, 2004). 
4 Farinós and Fernández (1999) find that takeovers reduce liquidity and trading activity. 
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The second issue we aim to analyze is whether the liquidity and trading acti-
vity levels following SOs are linked to the variables or characteristics that define 
them (relative size and retail composition). Note that the second of these variables (re-
tail composition) is related to ownership dispersion, which is cited by some authors 
(Pham et al., 2003) as a means of achieving liquidity. We therefore analyze the role 
played by the offering discount in achieving liquidity, since, in an adverse selection 
environment, this could be the cost entailed in attracting uninformed investors and 
providing liquidity.
6
The article is structured into five sections. Section two is devoted to a de-
scription of the database. Section three analyses the effects of SOs on the liquidity 
and trading activity of stocks outstanding. Section four explores the role played by 
the SO-defining variables on changes in liquidity and trading activity, and the final 
section presents the main conclusions of the analysis. 
2. Data Base 
The sample consists entirely of secondary offerings by firms listed on the Spa-
nish continuous market from 1993 to 2005. The SIBE (Spanish Stock Market Inter-
linking System), or continuous market, is chosen in order to avoid problems with diffe-
rent trading systems. Another important reason for this choice is the greater liquidity of 
stock trading on this market, which provides more opportunity for arbitrage. The conti-
nuous market represents approximately 98.5 % of all stock market trading in Spain. 
Table A1 in the Appendix lists the firms that make up the study sample and 
gives the main characteristics of the data. A total of 32 SOs were made over the study 
period (1993–2005). However, these SOs were marked by a variety of events af-
fecting liquidity and trading activity of shares for the pre and post secondary offering 
periods that might distort the results of the analysis, for example, stocks that were not 
listed on the continuous market at any point in the observation window, offerings that 
were the object of splits, variations in shares outstanding (new share offerings, list-
ings of previously offered shares, capital reductions), company mergers, etc. Any se-
condary offering featuring one of these circumstances was eliminated from the sample. 
Of the 32 offerings originally considered for the study, 16 were found to be entirely 
free of any such circumstances. 
All data relating to SO characteristics and conditions were obtained from the re-
cords of the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (National Stock Exchange 
Commission) and Madrid Stock Exchange price bulletins. The remaining daily stock 
market data that were required (price, bid-ask spread, depth, and trading volume) 
were provided by the Sociedad de Bolsas (Stock Exchanges Company). 
3. SOs and Their Effects on the Liquidity and Trading Activity of Shares 
Outstanding 
In this section we test the effects of SOs on the liquidity and trading activity 
of shares outstanding. The variables used to measure share liquidity are the bid-ask 
6 Several explanations for offering underpricing are based on the theory of information asymmetries. In
particular, uninformed investors must incur some additional cost to collect information and therefore will
not be induced to participate unless a higher degree of discount is offered. See (O’Hara, 1995) for an over-
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spread, the relative depth, and the market quality index.
7 The bid-ask spread (Sit)
is the average cost of simultaneously buying and selling one stock i on trading day t.
It is defined as the average value of the quotient obtained by dividing the price 
spread by its middle price, as shown in expression (1). The price spread in an order- 
-driven  market,  like  that  of  Spain,  is  calculated  from  the difference  between 
the lowest price at which investors are willing to sell share i at time t' on trading 
day t (the price that investors would have to pay for one share,
Ask
it t' P ), and the high-
est price at which they are willing to buy it (the price that investors would charge 
for one unit of this asset, 
Bid
it t' P ).
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where T is the number of share i’s price spreads during day t.
The relative depth (RDit) represents the average number of shares i available 
on each side of the market at the best first level prices on trading day t relative to 
the number of stocks outstanding;
8 and the market quality index (MQIit) is the ratio 
between the middle relative depth and the bid-ask spread. This can be written as 
follows: 









         (2) 
Liquidity is certain to be enhanced when the bid-ask spread narrows and 
the relative depth increases or when the market quality index increases. 
Given the nature of SOs, which flood the market with stock formerly held 
by only one or a few stockholders for corporate control purposes, it is reasonable 
to expect an increase in share liquidity following the execution of such operations. 
Portfolio selection considerations relative to the number of shares outstanding, in-
vestors, and dispersion of ownership structure point towards this relationship.
9
The bid-ask spread can be expected to decrease while the relative depth and mar-
ket quality index increase, as can be predicted by using the information-based hy-
pothesis. 
For the same reasons given above, a positive effect on trading activity is also 
likely. The measures used in this paper to analyze this question are relative trading
7 The nature of the data for this study obliged us to use the usual liquidity measures. Intraday data, how-
ever, would allow the use of more sophisticated liquidity measures (see (Frey, Grammig, 2006)). 
8 Note that in the study sample the number of shares outstanding may differ considerably across firms that 
are the object of a secondary offering. To keep the data comparable, therefore, we take relative values, di-
viding by  the number  of  stocks outstanding.  The trading  volume,  number  of  transactions,  and  trading
volume per transaction are treated in the same way.  
9 Note that, although, theoretically, the number of stocks outstanding on the market after the offering is not
increased, because no new shares are released, in reality there will be a higher number of stocks on
the market that could be bought or sold (the free float increases), as well as a higher number of investors 
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volume or turnover, relative number of transactions, and relative trading volume or 
turnover per transaction. 
The relative trading volume (RTVit) or turnover reflects the number of shares i
that are traded on trading day t relative to the number of shares outstanding. The re-
lative number of transactions (RNTit) represents how many times shares i are traded 
on trading day t relative to the number of shares outstanding, and the relative trading 
volume per transaction (RTVTit), also named the relative size or turnover per trans-
action, quantifies the average number of shares i that are traded in each transaction 
on trading day t relative to the number of stocks outstanding. 
In addition to the above variables, we also consider two that are linked to 
price variations: return and volatility. The return (Rit) reflects the price variations of 
share i on trading day t, and volatility (Vit) measures the rank maximum of the price 
variation of share i on trading day t, as shown in expression (3). 









P+   P
        (3) 
where 
Max
it P  and 
Max
it P  are the maximum and minimum prices of share i on trading 
day t.
The “opportunity window” hypothesis (Ritter, 1991), (Spiess, Affleck-Graves, 
1995) and the increase in shares offered on the market, with the subsequent price 
pressure, the “price pressure” hypothesis, (Loderer, Cooney, Van Drunen, 1991), and 
(Corwin, 2003), give reason to predict a reduction in price variation following the exe-
cution of SOs.  
This  study bases  the analysis  of  these  issues on  the variables  that  measure 
liquidity, trading activity, and price variations before and after offerings, focusing 
specifically  on  the pre  secondary  offering  period,  which  is  the 125  trading  days 
preceding the authorization of the offering (from day –135 to day –11, that is, ap-
proximately 6 months before the secondary offering), and the post secondary offering 
period, which is the 125 trading days following the execution of the offering (from 
day 11 to day 135, that is, approximately 6 months after the secondary offering). By 
comparing these two periods we should be able to measure the effect of offerings on 
the variables under analysis. The purpose of the exclusion period, that is, the 10 trad-
ing days prior to the authorization and the 10 trading days following the execution of 
the offering, is to prevent contamination of the pre and post offering periods by ef-
fects solely due to the authorization and execution of the offering.
10
To measure the impact of SOs on the variables in our analysis we use the foll-
owing system of equations: 
  Xit = Ei0 + Ei1 . PSODt + Hit i = 1, … , 16       (4) 
where Xit is the variable X for firm i on day t and PSODt is the dummy variable for 
the post secondary offering period (from day 11 to 135). 
The regression coefficient Ei1 of the dummy variable for the post seconda- 
ry offering period represents the average variation of the variable X for firm i after 
10 See (Miller, Reilly, 1987), (Aggarwal, Rivoli, 1990), (Krigman, Shaw, Womack, 1999), (Pham et al., 
2003), (Corwin, Harris, Lipson, 2004), and (Zheng, Ogden, Jen, 2005) in the case of IPOs. 26                                  Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 1-2
the execution of the secondary offering and therefore measures the impact of the of-
fering on this variable. We use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) as the sys-
tem estimation method. GMM is a robust estimator in that it does not require in-
formation on the exact distribution of the disturbances and can be made robust to 
heteroscedasticity and/or autocorrelation of unknown form. Since we are interested in 
knowing the average effect of SOs on liquidity and trading activity, the null hypo-














have also tested the null hypothesis that all Ei1 are jointly zero.
11
TABLE 1  Changes in Liquidity, Trading Activity, and Price Variations after the Execution 
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(0.031)         (0.000) 
Notes: For each variable an equation system is estimated using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM): 
        Xit = ȕi 0 + ȕi 1 . PSODt + İit i = 1, … , 16          (4) 
where Xit is the variable X for firm i on day t and PSODt is the dummy variable for the post secondary 
offering period (from day 11 to 135). The regression coefficient ȕ i1 of the dummy variable for the post 
secondary offering period represents the average variation of the variable X for firm i after the exe-
cution of the secondary offering and therefore measures the impact of the offering on this variable. 
The coefficients shown in the table are the average values of the coefficients of the 16 regressions, as 











 .  0
16 ik
i
, for K = 0 and 1, respectively. P-v2 are the p-values of the Wald test of the null 
hypothesis that all ȕi1 are jointly zero. The sample is composed of 16 firms that made a secondary of-
fering over the period 1993–2005. 
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Table 1 presents the results of the equations system and shows the average va-
lues of the estimated coefficients Ei0 and Ei1, as well as the p-values of the Wald test of 
the null hypothesis that the average value is equal to zero and the p-values (p-v2) for 
the null hypothesis that all Ei1 are jointly zero. Turning to the analysis of the average 
value of the coefficient Ei1, the data reveal that all the changes in these variables after 
the execution of the offerings have the expected signs. A significant increase in liqui-
dity is shown by the narrowing of the bid-ask spread and the increase in the relative 
depth and also in the market quality index. The results reveal the liquidity injected into 
the market by these operations. A significant increase in trading activity is also shown 
by the relative number of transactions and the relative trading volume per transaction, 
and, as a consequence, an increase in the relative trading volume ratio, which confirms 
the fact that these SOs stimulate trading activity in this market. Finally, when it comes 
to price variations, the data reveal a significant decrease in returns and volatility, which 
is consistent with the “opportunity window” (Ritter, 1991), (Spiess, Affleck-Graves, 
1995) and “price pressure” hypotheses
12 (Loderer, Cooney, Van Drunen, 1991), (Cor-
win, 2003). Graphs 1, 2, and 3 show the impact of these operations on the main vari-
ables driving these results, that is, the market quality index, the relative trading volume 
and the return. The trend lines before and after the operations clearly reveal the increase 
in liquidity and trading activity and the decrease in returns. 
Nevertheless, given that the evolution of these variables for each firm du- 
ring the pre and post offering periods may be linked to the market trend, we isolate 
GRAPH 1  Market Quality Index around Secondary Offerings 
12 Similar conclusions can be drawn from the results of the test to determine whether all the ȕi1 are jointly 
equal to zero, except for the return variable, for which the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at standard
levels of significance. Despite the negative sign of the majority of the coefficients, high individual varian-
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the market effect on these variables in our analysis by using the following system of 
equations: 
                  Xit = Ei0 + Ei1 . PSODt + Ei2 .  t X + Hit i = 1, … , 16                     (5) 
where Xit is the variable X for firm i on day t, PSODt is the dummy variable for the post 
GRAPH 2  Relative Trading Volume around Secondary Offerings 
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secondary offering period (from day 11 to 135), and  t X  is the average value of the va-
riable X on day t for the rest of the firms that form the market. 
The regression coefficient ȕi1 of the dummy variable for the post secondary of-
fering period represents the average variation of the variable X for firm i after the exe-
cution of the secondary offering without the market effect and therefore measures 
the impact of the offering on this variable excluding the market effect. We also use 
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) as the system estimation method. 
Table 2 presents the results of the system of equations. In particular, we show 
the averages of the estimated coefficients Ei0, Ei1,a n dEi2, as well as the p-values of 
the Wald tests for the null hypothesis that any of these averages is equal to zero and 
TABLE 2  Changes in Liquidity, Trading Activity, and Price Variations after the Execution 
of Secondary Offerings Excluding the Market Effect 
Regression coefficients 








Bid-ask spread  0.00237 
(0.000) 
-0.00092 
(0.000)      (0.000) 
0.16905 
(0.000) 
Relative depth  3.72E-05 
(0.000) 
-1.14E-06 
(0.522)      (0.000) 
1.87826 
(0.000) 
Market quality index  0.00635 
(0.000) 
0.00060 




Relative trading volume  0.00114 
(0.000) 
0.00048 
(0.000)      (0.000) 
1.66043 
(0.000) 
Relative number of transactions  -4.66E-08 
(0.785) 
5.04E-07 
(0.000)      (0.000) 
4.62166 
(0.000) 









Return  0.00052 
(0.198) 
-0.00138 
(0.008)      (0.245) 
1.09894 
(0.000) 
Volatility  -0.00102 
(0.391) 
0.00101 
(0.116)      (0.000) 
0.92485 
(0.000) 
Notes: For each variable an equation system is estimated using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM): 
Xit = ȕi 0 + ȕi1 . PSODt + ȕi2 .  t X + İit i = 1, … , 16      (5) 
where Xit is the variable X for firm i on day t, PSODt is the dummy variable for the post secondary of-
fering period (from day 11 to 135), and  t X  is the average value of the variable X on day t for the re-
mainder of the firms in the market. The regression coefficient ȕi1 of the dummy variable for the post 
secondary offering period represents the average variation of the variable X for firm i after the execu-
tion of the secondary offering without the market effect and therefore measures the impact of the offer-
ing on this variable excluding the market effect. 
The coefficients shown in the table are the average values of the coefficients of the 16 regressions, as 
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i
, for K = 0, 1 and 2, respectively. P-v2 are the p-values of the Wald test of the null 
hypothesis that all ȕi1 are jointly zero. The sample is composed of 16 firms that made a secondary 
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the p-values (p-v2) for the null hypothesis that all Ei1 are jointly zero. As can be seen, 
all the variables present a significantly positive relationship with the market, clearly de-
monstrating the need to eliminate this effect in order to determine whether the observed 
findings are caused by the SOs themselves or by the market state in which the latter 
tend to take place. Focusing on the analysis of the mean value of coefficient Ei1,
the data again reveal a significant increase in liquidity shown in the narrowing of 
the bid-ask spread, as well an increase in the market quality index (although signi-
ficant only at the 10% level). The above observed increase in relative depth, how-
ever, appears to be due more to market conditions than to the impact of the opera-
tions themselves. The trading activity, furthermore, shows a significant increase, which 
is reflected in the relative number of transactions, the relative trading volume per 
transaction, and the relative trading volume. These results provide evidence to sup-
port the argument that SOs produce an increase in share liquidity and trading activity 
that is directly attributable to these operations. A final observation is that there are no 
significant changes in volatility but, as expected, there is a significant decrease in 
return.
13
To  increase  the robustness  of  the findings,  the same  analysis  was  repeated 
using pre and post secondary offering periods of 60 trading days, instead of the 125 
used in the analysis described above, with basically the same results
14, that is, a nar-
rowing of the bid-ask spread and an increase in the market quality index. In this case, 
it was also possible to observe a significant increase in the relative depth. Since this 
effect was not observed for longer pre and post secondary offering periods, it can be 
assumed to be an exclusively short-term effect that later fades. The effect on the trad-
ing volume was also very similar. In particular, not only the relative number of trans-
actions, but also the relative trading volume per transaction and the relative trading 
volume show a significant increase. Finally, as for the full sample period, it was pos-
sible to observe a significant decrease in return and no effect on volatility. 
4. Characteristics of SOs and the Liquidity and Trading Activity of Shares 
Outstanding 
The analysis presented in the above section focused on the overall effects of SOs. 
Arguably, however, the effects of these operations on liquidity and trading activity in 
shares outstanding will differ as a function of their size and their distribution structure 
(retail and institutional tranches).
15 The relative size argument seems plausible, in view 
of the fact that if these operations have an impact on liquidity and trading activity in 
shares outstanding, the larger the operation the greater the impact to be expected. Ne-
13 The effects on liquidity and trading activity show up clearly in the Wald tests for the null hypothesis
that all Ei1 are jointly zero, but the results regarding the effect on return and volatility are not so clear.
Although 14 of the 16 return coefficients are negative, significance at the standard levels cannot be
shown due to high variance. The opposite applies for volatility. Overall, the individual values are indi-
vidually significant, but the 9 positive and 7 negative values result in a positive average value that does
not prove significant at the conventional levels. Nevertheless, although it can be conclusively rejected
that the coefficients are jointly equal to zero, their effect is far from homogeneous, as shown by the re-
sult for the average value test. 
14 These results are available from the authors upon request.
15 Note that in this type of operation the issuer of the SO defines the ownership structure of the offering 
through the percentage of shares offered to the retail (small investors) and institutional (institutional inves-
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vertheless, arguments based on the distribution structure, while less direct, appear just 
as convincing. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) contribute to the debate by demonstrat-
ing the existence of an inverse relationship between bid-ask spread and concentration 
of ownership, while, more specifically, Bhide (1993) and Holmstrom y Tirole (1993) 
show that a more disperse ownership structure can provide greater liquidity, which can 
be achieved with a larger retail composition of the offering. Pham et al. (2003) also 
show that liquidity is directly linked to dispersion of ownership. According to these 
authors, liquidity is crucial to ensure future share offerings. If the initial owners keep 
a large part of a firm’s shares, they should improve liquidity by increasing the percen-
tage of individual investors and thereby creating a more disperse structure. This also 
helps to prevent potential hostile takeovers (Shleifer, Wishny, 1986). 
As noted earlier, however, both Pham et al. (2003) and Ellul and Pagano 
(2006) relate achieved liquidity to the degree of underpricing. Pham et al. (2003) link 
the degree of underpricing to the cost of creating incentives to attract small-scale 
investors in order to increase the liquidity of the stock. We therefore aim to introduce 
the offering discount variable as a measure of underpricing in order to explain varia-
tions in liquidity and trading activity following SOs.  
The first step of this approach was to run a regression to examine relative size 
and retail composition, that is, the variables that define the offering, for their expla-
natory capacity for the offering discount, as shown in the following (cross-section) 
specification:
Di = O0 + O1 . RSi + O2 . RCi + Hi        (6) 
where Di is the discount of offering i and reflects the difference between the market 
average price of share i on the days the operation is authorized and executed and 
the average price of the offering relative to the market average price of share i on 
the days the operation is authorized and executed, RSi is the relative size of offering i
and represents the number of shares i offered relative to the number of shares i out-
standing, and RCi is the retail composition of offering i and reflects the number of 
shares i offered in the retail tranche relative to the number of shares i offered. 
Given the limited number of observations, the bootstrap procedure was used 
to obtain the average values of the coefficients and the simulated p-values. The actual 
procedure was to perform 1,000 OLS regressions with 16 observations per regression 
drawn with replacement. The critical values were obtained using the standard boot-
trap percentile test procedure, which retains the essentially non-parametric nature of 
the bootstrap approach without imposing parametric assumptions on the distribution. 
The results (see Table 3) clearly allow us to conclude that the selected dis-
count level in SOs has both characteristics. Logically, the larger the operation, the higher 
the discount offered to ensure its success. Moreover, in line with the arguments put 
forward by Pham et al. (2003), a higher discount is more likely in SOs when the retail 
composition of the offering for individual shareholders is bigger, in order to compen-
sate them for the higher adverse selection costs they face and to increase the appeal of 
the shares. This appears to be direct evidence that raising the percentage of individual 
shareholders in order to increase share liquidity entails an explicit cost linked to the de-
signated percentage discount for the offering.  32                                  Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 1-2
Given the high level of correlation observed between the discount of the offer, 
Di, and the defining characteristics of the operation, RSi and RCi, the residual of 
the regression, RDi, will be used to proceed towards the analysis of the explanatory 
capacity provided by these variables for variations in liquidity and trading activity 
following SOs. Formally, we propose the (cross-section) specification, also estimated 
using the bootstrap method with 1,000 OLS regressions of 16 observations each. 
Ei1 = G0 + G1 . RSi + G2 . RCi + G3 . RDi + Hi      (7) 
where Ei1 is the regression coefficient of equation (5), which represents the average 
variation of the variable X for firm i after the execution of the secondary offering with-
out the market effect, and RSi and RCi are the variables defined and used in the re-
gression of equation (6) and RDi is the residual also obtained from equation (6). 
These results are summarized in Table 4. The data reveal that, in overall terms, 
retail composition (RC), is the variable that provides higher explanatory capacity to 
explain variations in liquidity and trading activity following SOs, although the effect 
is less noticeable than suggested by other studies on IPOs. Probably, the effort to 
achieve liquidity to maximize the success of future placings is greater in IPOs than in 
SOs. As noted earlier, the variable with higher impact is RC, and even then not for all 
the variables relating to these measures. As far as liquidity is concerned, the effect on 
the bid-ask spread, despite showing the expected sign, does not prove significant, 
while the effect on relative depth is more noteworthy. As a result, we are able to ob-
serve the expected significant effects on the market quality index variable. In terms 
of trading activity, while it is possible to observe a significant increase in the relative 
number of transactions, this is offset by a reduction in the relative trading volume per 
transaction, due to the increase in the percentage of individual holdings. Thus, the over-
all effect on the relative trading volume is not significant at the standard levels. 
TABLE 3  Offering Discount: Relation to Relative Size and Retail Composition 
of the Offerings 
Regression coefficients 













Notes: Average results from the 1,000 cross-sectional regressions: 
Di = O0 + O1 . RSi + O2 . RCi + ̣İi                 (6) 
where Di is the discount of the offering i, defined as the ratio of the difference between the market ave-
rage price of share i on the days of the authorization and market operation and the offering average 
price to the market average price of share i on the days of the authorization and market operation, RSi
is the relative size of the offering i, defined as the ratio of the numbers of shares i offered to the number 
of shares i outstanding, and RCi is the retail composition of the offering i, defined as the ratio of 
the number of shares i offered in the retail tranche to the number of shares i offered. 
The coefficients shown in the table are the average values of the coefficients of 1,000 bootstrap OLS 
regressions with 16 observations per regression extracted with replacement, as well as the simulated 
p-values of the 1,000 bootstrap regressions. The sample is composed of 16 secondary offerings over 
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The relative size of the offering (RS) does not appear to show any explanatory 
capacity for the changes in the variables relating to share liquidity and trading acti-
vity shares following SOs, with the exception of an increase in the relative trading 
volume per transaction. This is a significant finding since it suggests that the effects 
on liquidity and trading activity are due not so much to the percentage of shares 
offered as to the way they are distributed. This is in quite close keeping with recent 
findings for IPOs, underpricing, ownership structure, and liquidity. Moreover, apart 
from its effect in attracting small-scale investors, which is observed in a significant 
increase in the relative number of transactions, the explanatory capacity of the dis-
count level (RD) is merely testimonial. This further justifies the stress laid earlier on 
the fact that the role played by the discount is basically only as the cost required to 
attract small-scale investors and thereby increase liquidity. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have analyzed the influence of SOs on the liquidity and
trading activity of shares outstanding, which, given the lack of previous studies on
TABLE 4  Changes in Liquidity and Trading Activity after the Execution of Secondary 
Offerings: Relation to Relative Size, Retail Composition, and Residual Discount 
of the Offerings 
Regression coefficients 



































































Notes:  Average results from the 1,000 cross-sectional regressions for each variable: 
Ei1 = G0 + G1 . RSi + G2 . RCi + G3 . RDiHi    (7) 
where Ei1 is the regression coefficient of equation (5) in Table 2, which represents the average varia-
tion of the variable X for firm i after secondary offering execution without the market effect, RSi is
the relative size of offering i, defined as the ratio of the number of shares i offered to the number of 
shares i outstanding, RCi is the retail composition of offering i, defined as the ratio of the number 
of shares i offered in the retail tranche to the number of shares i offered, and RDi is the residual dis-
count of offering i, defined as the residual from the regression of the offering discount variable using 
RSi and RCi as explanatory variables.  
The coefficients shown in the table are the average values of the coefficients of 1,000 bootstrap OLS 
regressions with 16 observations per regression extracted with replacement, as well as the simulated 
p-values of the 1,000 bootstrap regressions. The sample is composed of 16 firms that made a secon-
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the topic, constitutes a novel aspect of this field of research. Our findings are based 
on an analysis of the variations in the variables that measure  the liquidity, trading 
activity, and price variations before and after offerings. 
According to the results obtained, SOs cause an increase in the liquidity and 
trading activity of the shares being offered, while bringing about a decrease in price 
variations. A narrowing of the bid-ask spread, a reduction in returns, and an increase 
in the market quality index, relative trading volume, relative number of transactions, 
and relative trading volume per transaction all help to confirm this finding. 
In addition, the discount to SOs has been found to be explained by the offer-
ing strategy in terms of relative size and retail composition. 
The fact that the discount is found to be directly linked to the size of the offer-
ing is hardly surprising, since its purpose is to maximize the success of the operation. 
Moreover, it is also directly linked to the percentage of individual shareholders (retail 
shareholders), a finding clearly consistent with the conclusions presented by authors 
such as Pham et al. (2003), who relate underpricing with the cost of obtaining liqui-
dity to create incentives to attract small-scale investors. 
Finally, the variations in liquidity and trading activity observed after SOs are 
found to bear some relation to the specific characteristics of the operations, particu-
larly the type of ownership structure. This may lend some support, albeit less than in 
the case of IPOs, to the arguments put forward in recent research on SOs, which 
show that the liquidity following these operations is basically achieved by attracting 
small-scale investors, who are quick to respond to underpricing. Surprisingly, the size 
of the offering contributes little further explanatory capacity for the changes in li-
quidity  observed  after  SOs,  despite  the fact  that  it  might  be  reasonable  to  link 
the percentage of ownership offered with the ex post level of liquidity. The part of 
the discount that remains unexplained by the size of the offering and the percentage 
of retail shareholders also lacks any significant capacity to explain these variations in 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A1  Sample of Secondary Offerings in Spain (1993–2005) 







Repsol  1993 
Instituto Nacional 
de Hidrocarburos 
03/10/93  03/31/93  40,000,000 
Argentaria  1993  Soc. Est. de Patrimonio I  10/22/93  11/17/93  29,945,455 
Aumar  1994 
Bco. Central 
Hispanoamericano 
03/10/94  03/28/94  8,250,000 
Fcc  1994  Several  03/15/94  03/30/94  3,000,000 
Endesa  1994  Teneo  05/03/94  06/01/94  22,609,183 
Asturiana del Zinc (1)  1994
Corp. Industrial y 
Financiera Banesto 
12/13/94  12/19/94  8,911,047 
Mapfre Vida (1)  1995  Corp. Mapfre  01/19/95  02/09/95  1,715,200 
Repsol  1995 
Instituto Nacional 
de Hidrocarburos 
03/17/95  04/11/95  57,000,000 
Gines Navarro (1)  1995  Several  06/20/95  07/10/95  5,600,000 
Telefónica   1995  Soc. Est. de Patrimonio II  09/07/95  10/03/95  112,085,400 
Repsol   1996 
Soc. Est. de Partic. 
Industriales (Sepi) 
01/16/96  02/06/96  33,000,000 
Argentaria  1996  Soc. Est. de Patrimonio I  02/23/96  03/26/96  28,670,422 
Global Stell Wire (1)  1996  Socten Auxiliar  11/12/96  11/28/96  10,708,531 
Gas Natural SDG  1996 
Soc. Est. de Partic. 
Industriales (Sepi) 
11/21/96  12/03/96  1,423,520 
Telefónica (1)  1997 
Soc. Est. de Partic. 
Patrimoniales (Seppa) 
01/17/97  02/18/97  191,019,467 
Repsol  1997 
Soc. Est. de Partic. 
Industriales (Sepi) 
04/04/97  04/29/97  30,002,859 
Catalana 
de Occidente (1) 
1997  Catalana de Occidente  04/07/97  04/22/97  2,637,257 
Faes (1)  1997  Several  07/10/97  07/23/97  2,400,149 
Endesa (1)  1997 
Soc. Est. de Partic. 
Industriales (Sepi) 
09/23/97  10/21/97  260,005,599 
Argentaria (1)  1998 
Soc. Est. de Partic. 
Patrimoniales (Seppa) 
01/23/98  02/17/98  35,764,129 
Vidriera Leonesa (1) 1998 
Vista Desarroyo and RBS 
Trus Bank 
02/19/98  02/25/98  1,211,903 
Tabacalera (1)  1998 
Soc. Est. de Partic. 
Patrimoniales (Seppa) 
04/08/98  04/28/98  96,188,092 
Koipe (1)  1998  Several  04/30/98  05/07/98  1,828,758 
Endesa (1)  1998 
Soc. Est. de Partic. 
Industriales (Sepi) 
05/14/98  06/09/98  332,200,112 
Bodegas y Bebidas  1999 
Corp. de Alimentación 
y Bebidas 
03/18/99  03/26/99  4,445,631 
Tele Pizza (1)  1999 
Transeuropean Research 
Traders
10/25/99  10/26/99  53,354,089 
Amadeus (1)  2000  Several  05/19/00  05/24/00  75,000,000 




Soc. Est. de Partic. 
Industriales (Sepi) 
06/29/01  07/10/01  8,152,949 
Zeltia (1)  2002  Zeltia  05/10/02  05/21/02  72,665 
Zeltia  2003  Zeltia  03/06/03  03/20/03  136,225 
Red Eléctrica 
Española 
2003  Endesa and others  06/18/03  06/18/03  37,875,600 
Notes: (1) denotes that the offering was eliminated from the study. Although the original sample comprised 
32 SOs over the period 1993–2005, the final sample is formed by 16 SOs that were free of any pro-
blems relating to the liquidity and trading activity of shares during the pre and post secondary offering 
periods that might distort the results of the analysis. 36                                  Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 1-2
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